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Volunteering plays a prominent role in the charitable provision of goods and services, yet we 
know relatively little about why people engage in such prosocial acts. The list of possible 
motivations is long, but recent research has focused on altruism, reputational concerns, and 
material incentives. We present an analysis of a unique data set that combines an 
experimental measure of altruism, surveyed measures of other factors including reputational 
concerns, and call records from volunteer firefighters that provide an objective measure of 
the hours volunteered. Controlling for a variety of other explanations, we find that altruism 
and reputational concerns are positively associated with the decision to volunteer. Moreover, 
by utilizing variation in the presence and level of small stipends paid to the firefighters, we 
find that the positive effect of monetary incentives declines with reputational concerns, 
supporting a prediction that extrinsic incentives can crowd out prosocial behavior. 
JEL Classification:  C93, D12, J22, D64, D82 
Keywords:  volunteer, altruism, reputation, firefighter 
Corresponding author: 
Caitlin Knowles Myers 
Department of Economics 
Middlebury College 
Middlebury, VT 05753 
USA 
E-mail: cmyers@middlebury.edu 
* We thank the NSF (SES-Career 0092953) and Middlebury College for funding. In addition, we thank 
Peter Matthews for very helpful discussion of the theoretic modeling section and John Maluccio and 
Casey Rothschild for further helpful comments. We also thank Cristina Connolly and Sara Lowes for 
highly competent research assistance. 1 Introduction
In 2001 in the United States, an estimated 84 million people volunteered an
average of 4 hours per week, yielding the annual equivalent of over 200 billion
dollars of labor (Independent Sector, 2001). The prominent role of volunteering
in the charitable provision of goods and services has helped to motivate a variety
of theoretical models of prosocial behavior over the past twenty years. However,
a lack of appropriate data has left economists with an incomplete understanding
of why people supply labor seemingly for free.
To date, the empirical literatures on volunteering and altruism have relied
mostly on a handful of survey-based data sets or on evidence from laboratory
settings. Survey-based evidence suggests that wages and income are related to
volunteer labor supply (Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987; Freeman, 1997), but Free-
man (1997) ﬁnds that a far larger determinant than cost is simply being asked
to volunteer and concludes that volunteer labor supply is determined more by
tastes for prosocial activities than by income and costs. In addition, govern-
ment spending appears to at least partially crowd out volunteering, suggesting
that volunteers care both about the level of provision of their product as well as
about the act of giving itself (Menchik and Weisbrod, 1987; Brown and Lank-
ford, 1992; Duncan, 1999; Ziemek, 2006). Laboratory experiments designed to
measure altruism have told us that people behave in a manner consistent with
a mixture of “pure” and “warm-glow” altruism, but it is unclear to what ex-
tent either drives the decision to volunteer outside of the lab (Andreoni, 1993;
Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Forsythe et al., 1994; Hoﬀman et al., 1994; Palfrey
and Prisbrey, 1997; Goeree et al., 2002; Andreoni and Miller, 2002).
In this paper we add to our understanding of the motivations of volunteers
with a unique data set that combines experimental and survey data for both
non-volunteer community members and volunteer ﬁreﬁghters with an objective
1measure of the ﬁreﬁghters’ provision of volunteer labor via department records.
Our data provide both the usual demographic controls as well as measures
of various taste-related factors that may inﬂuence the decision to volunteer.
Moreover, they allow us to avoid many possible pitfalls of using survey or lab-
based data alone. Along with problems associated with the hypothetical nature
of some survey questions or the measurement error likely to occur when people
are asked to recall their level of volunteerism, self reports may be especially
susceptible to what Carpenter (2002) terms idealized persona bias in which a
respondent projects the person that he would like to be. We therefore use
an experimental measure of altruism via the dictator game in which there are
real material costs associated with revealing prosocial preferences. In addition,
rather than relying on self-reports of volunteer labor supply, we utilize call
records from ﬁre departments that record which members “turned out” for calls
over the course of a calendar year.
We ﬁnd that altruism is a key motivator in choosing to join the volunteer
ﬁre service, which supports the external validity of our version of the dictator
game in predicting real-life behavior. However, conditional on selection, altru-
ism plays a role in training hours but not in call response, suggesting that the
visibility of the action may be important. In contrast to the results for altruism,
reputational concerns, as proxied by having a vanity license plate, are associ-
ated both with the decision to volunteer as well as with the visible activity of
call response. Moreover, we ﬁnd that paying small stipends to the volunteers
increases turnout for some but that the eﬀect is dampened for those who have
greater reputational concerns. These results conﬁrm recent theoretical predic-
tions that providing extrinsic motivations to volunteers can have unintended
negative eﬀects (B´ enabou and Tirole, 2006).
We proceed with an overview of theories of prosocial behavior such as vol-
unteering and with a model that incorporates altruism, reputational concerns,
2and material rewards into the decision to volunteer. Section 3 then provides
a description of the data. In Sections 4 and 5 we examine selection into the
ﬁre service and the call turn out of volunteer ﬁreﬁghters. We oﬀer concluding
remarks in Section 6.
2 A model of “turning out”
Papers in the public ﬁnance and labor literatures have traditionally treated
prosocial behavior such as volunteering as generating some combination of a
public good, consumption good, or investment good (e.g., Menchik and Weis-
brod, 1987; Brown and Lankford, 1992; Duncan, 1999). Others have focused
more on the role of “pure” and “warm-glow” altruism in motivating volunteers
(e.g., Becker, 1974; Andreoni, 1989, 1990, 2006; B´ enabou and Tirole, 2006). The
diﬀerences in terminology– which serve to emphasize the nature of the activity
versus the nature of the volunteer– mask what are essentially similar approaches.
Whether volunteering is thought of as a public good or as the product of pure
altruism, the individual cares only that some level of the good is provided and
not who is responsible for the provision; hence, government spending on the
public good will “crowd out” private donations of time or money. If volunteer-
ing is instead a consumption good or the product of “impure” or “warm-glow”
altruism, (Andreoni, 1990) the act of giving itself generates utility for the volun-
teer, and government provision will not compete to the same extent with private
provision. A third possibility is that there are other extrinsic motivations for
volunteering beyond utility gained from the public good created or by the act
of giving. One example is investment models in which volunteering is a means
of obtaining human capital that will yield returns in the labor market (Menchik
and Weisbrod, 1987; Ziemek, 2006).
Like Ariely et al. (2007) we borrow from the model of prosocial behavior de-
3veloped by B´ enabou and Tirole (2006) (BT), which emphasizes the relationship
between (pure or impure) altruism, extrinsic motivations, and reputation. Our
model is slightly simpler in that we focus attention on one’s interest in main-
taining a reputation for prosociality and ignore any other reputational concerns.
While simpler, our version is still suﬃcient to motivate the issues on which we
collect data.
Agents in the model are motivated by three factors: altruistic preferences,
extrinsic monetary incentives, and reputational concerns. Agents with altruistic
preferences for the social good place a value, va on prosocial activities, a, like
joining the local ﬁre department or ”turning out” for individual calls. Agents
may receive monetary compensation, y, for their prosocial acts (e.g., some ﬁre-
ﬁghters receive modest hourly wages for their eﬀorts) which they value at vyy.
Lastly, some agents care about their reputations in the community according to
R(a,y). Combining these three sources of motivation with the cost of engaging
in prosocial acts, C(a), we have:
U(a) = (va + vyy)a + R(a,y) − C(a). (1)




; however, the image concerns require further elucidation. We as-
sume that an agent’s preference type, (va,vy), is determined by an independent
draw from a bivariate normal distribution and deﬁne one’s reputation concern
as follows:
R(a,y) = xIΥ(z)E(va a,y) (2) |
where x determines the extent to which an altruistic act will be visible and
IΥ : z → {0,1} is an indicator function publicly identifying those agents who
are motivated by reputation, E(va a,y), or the beliefs of others about the agent’s |
4value on prosocial activities. In other words, agents with image concerns com-
prise a subset Υ of the population.
Substituting (2) and ka
2
2
into (1) and diﬀerentiating yields the ﬁrst order
conditions for the optimal level of prosocial behavior which depend on whether
or not image concerns matter.
�
va + vyy if z / ∈ Υ
�
ak =
va + vyy + x
∂E(va|a,y) if z ∈ Υ
(3)
∂a
For those unconcerned with reputation the optimal level of prosociality is easy
to determine: a∗ = (va + vyy)/k.
Solving the ﬁrst order condition for those agents valuing reputation is harder
than it ﬁrst appears because it is not simply a matter of evaluating the expecta-
tion, E(va a,y), and substituting in its derivative. At the heart of the model is |
a signal extraction problem in which on-lookers need to evaluate the altruistic
intentions of the agent (va) using the entire decision problem. In other words
on-lookers need to anticipate how agents will respond to incentives when they
evaluate their actions.
To see the subtle nature of the problem, we (following BT) exploit the fact
that an agent’s choice of a reveals a clue about his intentions. The clue, from
(3), is that va + vyy is equal to ak − x
∂E(va|a,y) at the optimum. This means ∂a
that although one can not determine va directly from one’s choice of a, one
can make inferences about va based on va + vyy because va and vy are jointly






Valuation types are distributed N v ¯y
, σay σy
2 which means that
after considerable calculation1, one can derive
    
1Following from the fact that if (x1,x2) ∼ N
µ1 ,
σ1
2 σ12 then (x1 µ2 σ12 σ2 |x2) ∼
   2
N µ1 +
σ12 (x2 − µ2, (1 − �2)σ2 where � is the correlation coeﬃcient,
σ12 .
σ2 1 σ1σ2 2
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and after substituting from the ﬁrst order condition (3) we get





, va+vyy(ak − x
∂E(va|a,y)
− v ¯a − v ¯yy). (4) |
va+vyy ∂a
Now notice that if we take the derivative of (4) with respect to a we get
∂E(va|a,y)









, va+vyy. With some rearranging, (5) takes the form of a linear
va+vyy
diﬀerential equation that has the general solution
∂E(va|a,y)




in which ξ is a constant of integration. Lastly, as in BT, because the agent’s
objective function is well behaved only if ξ = 0, an interior solution occurs where
∂E(va|a,y) = ρk and the ﬁrst order condition for agents with image concerns ∂a
becomes
ak = va + vyy + xρk.
The last thing to do is to evaluate ρ and substitute. This results in the
following prediction about the extent to which agents will engage in prosocial
behavior.
Proposition 1 There is a unique reputational equilibrium in which prosocial
acts depend on one’s type, the material incentive and whether or not one is
concerned with reputation. Those not concerned with reputation contribute at
the level a∗ =
(va+
k









6Regardless of one’s concern for reputation, altruistic preferences, va, increase
one’s supply of prosocial behavior; however, the net eﬀect of the material in-
centive y is only unambiguous for those agents who do not worry about their
reputations. Using Proposition 1 we can generate three comparative static pre-
dictions which will form the basis of our empirical examination of the behavior
of volunteer ﬁreﬁghters.
Corollary 2 Agents with higher altruistic valuations supply more prosocial be-
havior.
Corollary 3 Agents who do not care about reputation supply more prosocial
behavior when the material incentive increases.
Corollary 4 For agents who care about reputation and σay = 0, an increase in
material incentives crowds out prosocial behavior to some extent.
Clearly, the derivative ∂a∗/∂va is positive indicating that we should expect
an unequivocal relationship between one’s altruistic preference and volunteer
behavior. Likewise, for those people who do not worry about their image, the
eﬀect of an increase in the material incentive, ∂a∗/∂y|z/ ∈Υ, should also be pos-
itive. However, once one’s image enters into the calculations, the eﬀect of ma-
terial incentives becomes less clear except for the fact that if prosocial acts are
not publicly visible (i.e., x = 0) then even people with reputation concerns act
as if they don’t care. In addition, if we are willing to consider the BT baseline
case of σay = 0, then the derivative of interest, ∂a∗/∂y|z∈Υ, indicates at least
partial crowding out because the derivative of the reputational part of a∗ is
negative. What is unknown is whether the negative eﬀect of material incentives
on one’s image is suﬃcient to counterbalance the draw of higher compensation.
In the case of our volunteer ﬁreﬁghters, we will see that the two eﬀects are of
roughly equal magnitude so that the net eﬀect of material incentives is zero for
volunteers with reputational concerns.
73 An overview of the data
Vermont is comprised mostly of rural areas that rely almost exclusively on
volunteer ﬁre ﬁreﬁghters to respond to emergencies such as hazardous material
spills, vehicle accidents, carbon monoxide alarms, and, of course, ﬁres. Of the
237 ﬁre departments in the state, only 10 are made of up of full-time paid
professional ﬁreﬁghters while the remainder rely on volunteers.
In February of 2006 we sent an initial survey to ﬁre chiefs in the state that re-
quested information on the number of ﬁreﬁghters at their department, any com-
pensation paid, annual calls, and training requirements. One hundred twenty
nine surveys were returned, yielding a response rate of 55 percent. Based on
these surveys, the time commitment for volunteer ﬁreﬁghters is substantial. Half
of departments require that volunteers complete “Fireﬁghter I” training, which
requires 144 hours of class time over seven months, before being admitted as
a full member. Fireﬁghters who drive department vehicles or seek additional
certiﬁcation in ﬁre ﬁghting, tactical rescue, and other areas of expertise are
required to complete additional training. All departments that we contacted
also have training sessions that are usually held once a month. In addition to
time spent training, volunteer ﬁreﬁghters in the state of Vermont are provided
pagers that issue a company-speciﬁc tone in the event of a call followed by radio
information from the dispatcher. Ideally, ﬁreﬁghters are expected to respond to
a tone if they are nearby and able, but in practice there is little oversight and
each ﬁreﬁghter decides on a call-by-call basis whether to respond. The number
of calls varies by department; the median number of calls in 2005 for our sample
was 79, or roughly a call every four and a half days.
In the summer of 2006 we conducted an experiment and a survey of 205
Vermont volunteer ﬁreﬁghters from 39 departments by both visiting individ-
ual stations and by attending the state ﬁreﬁghter convention or “muster.” The
8chiefs of six departments provided “call records” for 2005 with the date, time,
and nature of each call as well with information on which of the ﬁreﬁghters
responded. We then visited these departments during their monthly meetings
and passed out ﬁfteen-page experiment/survey booklets for the ﬁreﬁghters to
complete, which yielded 143 ﬁreﬁghter observations. We also set up a booth
at the annual state muster and passed out our materials, yielding another 62
observations, although these cannot be paired with call records from any de-
partment.
So that we could study selection into the ﬁre service, we also conducted
our protocol with non-ﬁreﬁghter Vermonters. We purchased a sample of 2000
addresses in the state that were drawn randomly on all criteria save gender. Be-
cause ﬁreﬁghters are predominantly male, we chose to oversample males in the
community survey. Community members were sent letters with a brief expla-
nation of the protocol accompanied by a booklet. In order to increase response
rates, we also gave them the option of responding online.2 Four hundred thirteen
community members responded to the full survey. Twelve of these community
members happened to be current volunteer ﬁreﬁghters and were added to the
sample of ﬁreﬁghters.3 Of the remaining 401 community members, 212 engaged
in some other form of volunteer activity and were removed from this analysis.
One hundred eighty nine community members reported no volunteer activity
and form the “control” group to which we compare ﬁreﬁghters.
Motivations for Volunteering
We gathered data on six behavioral motives for volunteering for the ﬁre
service. In addition to the two motives that the model focuses on (altruism
2Ninety percent of community members responded to the paper version of the protocol.
3For the twelve ﬁreﬁghters who completed the community surveys, we are missing infor-
mation on the ﬁreﬁghter-speciﬁc questions that were not included that version of the survey.
In our analysis, these twelve ﬁreﬁghters are included the probit models of selection into ﬁre-
ﬁghting. However, they are not included in the models of volunteer hours or call response.
9and reputation), we asked survey questions about career concerns, using the
ﬁre service to make or be with friends (or being an extrovert in general), one’s
attitude towards risk, and volunteering to comply with religious beliefs. The
details are as follows and the appendix reproduces the protocol for the behavioral
measures that we gathered.4
To measure altruism we designed a ﬁeld experiment based on the original
dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994) and a version in which a context similar to
the decision to volunteer was emphasized (Eckel and Grossman, 1996). In our
version of the game participants were ﬁrst asked to pick among thirteen charities
or write in a charity of their choice. We allowed our participants this latitude to
increase the chances that they felt altruistically towards the potential recipient.5
They were then asked to decide how much of a $100 endowment to transfer to
their chosen charity. Given the large expected sample size, each participant was
told that we would randomly implement 10% of the allocation decisions after
they were all collected.
After the collection phase was ﬁnished we wrote checks to the charities for
the total amounts donated and, to preserve the anonymity of their responses,
we sent unnamed VISA gift cards for the residual shares of the $100 to the
chosen decision-makers. Obviously, we could not run the experiment double
blind because we needed to send the chosen decision-makers the money that
they decided to keep and we needed match the experiment and survey data to
the call records for the ﬁreﬁghters. That said, we tried to make the decision as
anonymous as possible. In addition to the unnamed gift cards, participants were
always referred to by an anonymous alphanumeric code, they were explicitly told
4For the sake of length, we only highlight the design of our experiment and survey. The
protocol is discussed at length in Carpenter et al. (2007) which focuses on the diﬀerence
between our community sample and a sample of students. In addition, a copy of the ﬁreﬁghter
survey booklet is available on both authors’ web pages or by request.
5In the standard dictator experiment one has no choice over the recipient which means
that the experimenter can not distinguish between a lack of concern for the imposed recipient
or a general lack of altruism.
10not to write their names anywhere on the booklets and, during the ﬁrehouse
visits, participants returned their completed booklets in a covered box near the
back of the room away from the experimenters.
We decided that an indirect and less obvious approach towards measuring
one’s concern for reputation was best. Instead of asking directly whether partic-
ipants valued their reputation in the community, we asked a question designed
to determine whether they chose to display something that would aﬀect one’s
reputation or draw attention to one’s self. When people in the state of Vermont
register their automobiles they are randomly issued a license plate but can chose
to pay more to receive a “vanity plate.” Vanity plates consist of special letter-
ing or of the addition of a special placard to the plate. Examples of possible
placards include endangered animals on the “Conservation” plate, children’s
drawings on the “Building Bright Futures” plate, the purple heart medallion
issued to wounded soldiers or the international symbol of the Freemasons. We
asked whether our participants purchased such a vanity plate for their vehi-
cles. There are a variety of placards available to all Vermonters and we intend
ownership of a vanity plate to be a proxy for reputational concern for both com-
munity members and ﬁreﬁghters. However, most ﬁreﬁghters select the placard
shown in Figure 1. Displaying the maltese cross on one’s vehicle broadcasts to
everyone that the driver is a person that volunteers a lot of time to the com-
munity. It is also important to note that the placard in Figure 1 does not help
volunteers respond to tones quickly because most volunteer ﬁreﬁghters purchase
warning lights and sirens for their personal vehicles for this purpose. In other
words, there are ways to be modest about one’s involvement (e.g., by installing
dashboard-mounted rather than roof-mounted ﬂashing red lights on a personal
vehicle) but spending more on the plate in Figure 1 is not one of them.
We also considered other, un-modeled, reasons why people might volunteer
for the ﬁre service. It might be the case, for example, that people think that
11volunteering will enhance their performance on the job or help them get a job
(Clary and Snyder, 1999). To asses this motive we asked about the degree to
which respondents agreed with three statements about the career impacts of
volunteering. People might also volunteer because they are extroverts and the
ﬁre service allows them a new opportunity to interact with other people. In
addition to two direct questions about making friends or having friends already
in the ﬁre department, we asked participants to respond to ﬁve extroversion
statements borrowed from the NEO personality inventory (Costa and McCrae,
1992). Interior ﬁre ﬁghting is not the only risky endeavor facing volunteers;
simpler tasks like ventilating a roof can become dangerous when certain cir-
cumstances are accounted for (e.g., height, pitch, rooﬁng material, weather). It
might, therefore, be reasonable to believe that risk seekers are more likely to
join. We included six statements from the Weber et al. (2002) risk assessment
scale to assess each individual’s willingness to engage in behaviors that were
risky to one’s health (e.g., bungee jumping). The last factor that we though
might motivate a person to volunteer for the ﬁre service is his commitment to
religion. Because many religions preach service to one’s community, we asked
participants to rate how religious they were and we asked them how often they
attended religious services.
In addition to the behavioral measures that we focus on, we collected an
extensive set of demographics and two factors that we either thought would be
particularly important in this situation or have been discussed before. Many
ﬁre departments in Vermont are associated with long family traditions and
many people join because of family connections. Because of this we gathered
information on the number of family members one has in service (family ff).
Freeman (1997) found that one of the biggest indictors of whether or not one
volunteers is whether the person had been explicitly asked to serve. We asked
a similar question (invited).
12Table 1 provides a description of the variables used in the analysis as well as
their means for volunteer ﬁreﬁghters and non-volunteer community members.
For inventories in which participants responded to a number of statements (ca-
reer concerns, extroversion, attitudes towards risk), we summarize their mo-
tives via factor analysis. Looking at diﬀerences in means, we see that, relative
to non-volunteer community members, volunteer ﬁreﬁghters score higher on all
behavioral measures that we expect to contribute to a proclivity for prosocial
behaviors. Fireﬁghters allocate more to charity in the dictator game, are more
likely to have a vanity plate, and score higher on inventories of career concerns
in volunteering, social concerns in volunteering, extroversion, and risk. Fire-
ﬁghters are also more likely to be religious, to have family members who are
ﬁreﬁghters, and to have been invited to join the department.
Figure 2 presents a histogram of charitable allocations in the dictator game
for volunteer ﬁreﬁghters, volunteer community members, and non-volunteer
community members. While we limit later analysis to a comparison of ﬁreﬁght-
ers and non-volunteer community members, it is interesting to note that both
volunteer ﬁreﬁghters and volunteer community members have similar outcomes
in the dictator game that suggest that volunteering is positively associated with
this measure of altruism. Fifty seven percent of ﬁreﬁghters and 51 percent of
volunteering community members gave all $100 to charity while only 41 percent
of non-volunteers did so.6 Non-volunteers are more likely to have kept over half
of the money.
4 Estimates of volunteering
Table 2 presents the results of a probit analysis of selection into volunteer ﬁre-
ﬁghting. The dependent variable indicates whether a respondent belongs to
6We use the amount allocated to charity as our measure of altruism. If we instead include
an indicator for the respondent giving all of the money to charity, the results in the next two
sections are similar.
13our sample of volunteer ﬁreﬁghters or non-volunteer community members. We
progressively increase the number of controls until Model 3, which includes mea-
sures of various motivations for volunteering (altruism, reputational concerns,
career concerns, social concerns and extroversion, risk attitudes, religiosity, and
an indicator for being invited) as well as demographic controls for age, gender,
marital status, children, educational attainment, student status, employment
status, income, wages, Vermont nativity, charitable donations, and distance
from residence and workplace to the local ﬁre department.
Altruism, as measured by the respondent’s allocation to charity in the dicta-
tor game, is potentially endogenous to this model; altruism may motivate volun-
teers, but volunteering may also positively or negatively inﬂuence altruism. To
identify altruism, we use a plausibly exogenous variable from the respondent’s
background that may have inﬂuenced his level of altruism prior to his decision
to volunteer but that we do not expect to directly inﬂuence the current deci-
sion. We asked each respondent how much he or she thought his or her mom
would have allocated in the dictator experiment (mother allocation) with the
intention of measuring a variable that would have determined altruism via some
combination of “nature” and “nurture.” However, it is possible that respondent
would tend to simply attribute their decision in the experiment to any other
participant, yielding what psychologists would term a form of projection bias.
To control for this possibility, we also asked what the respondent thought a
random participant would donate (random participant allocation).
We carried out a range of diagnostic tests to assess the validity of these
instruments. Looking at an (unreported) ﬁrst stage regression of the dictator-
game allocation on mother allocation and random participant allocation as
well as the remaining exogenous variables from Model 3, we see that our two
instruments are highly signiﬁcant both individually and jointly (p-values for all
tests <0.001). As expected, respondents who report that their mothers would
14give more are predicted to give more themselves, even controlling for the pos-
sibility of projecting one’s level of altruism onto others. We also performed
a Sargan test of overidentiﬁcation and fail to reject the null hypothesis that
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in the selection equation.
This again supports the validity of the instruments. Finally, we conducted a
Hausman test comparing the coeﬃcients from an IV model from those in an
uninstrumented probit model. In this case the rank of the diﬀerenced variance
matrix did not equal the number of coeﬃcients being tested and we were un-
able to rely on the Hausman test statistic. However, a Hausman test for Model
1 indicates that the two models are statistically signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. More-
over, although we cannot assess statistical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence between
the overall models, the point estimates of the coeﬃcient on altruism are more
than twice as large when instrumented in Models 2 and 3 and the diﬀerence
is signiﬁcant in the former. Taken as a whole, the results suggest that it may
be necessary to endogenize altruism and we believe that we have appropriate
instruments for doing so.
Turning to the results in Table 2, we see that altruism does have a signiﬁcant
positive eﬀect on selecting into ﬁreﬁghting. An approximate one standard devi-
ation increase in allocate ($30) is associated with a 13 percentage point increase
in the probability of becoming a volunteer ﬁreﬁghter. The results conﬁrm that
altruism, as measured by the dictator game experiment, is positively associated
with the real-life prosocial behavior of volunteer ﬁreﬁghting.
Respondents with vanity plates, our proxy measure of reputational concern,
are 22 percentage points more likely to be a ﬁreﬁghter. However, like altruism,
vanity plate may be endogenous. It is not clear to what extent people who
value being seen select into ﬁreﬁghting and to what extent ﬁreﬁghters become
concerned with image after they volunteer. While we can only report the posi-
tive correlation here, the distinction becomes less important in discussing later
15results on the interaction between reputation and extrinsic motivations.
Examining the remaining incentives for volunteering, we ﬁnd that a one unit
increase on the 1–5 Likkert scale question “Volunteering is a good way to make
friends” is associated with a 24 percentage point increase in the probability
of volunteering. The point estimates conﬁrm that extroversion, risk-seeking
behavior, and religion are all positively correlated with becoming a ﬁreﬁghter,
but the estimates are not signiﬁcant. Having family members who are ﬁreﬁghters
also has a strong positive eﬀect, as does being invited to join the department.
5 Estimates of turnout
The data include both a subjective and objective measure of the level of par-
ticipation in the volunteer ﬁre service conditional on selection into it. First, we
asked ﬁreﬁghters to estimate their average monthly hours spent on training and
call response. Second, for ﬁreﬁghters from six participating departments we ob-
tained call records for 2005 that listed details of each call and which ﬁreﬁghters
responded.
Table 3 reports the results of separate log-hours regressions of ﬁreﬁghter-
estimated training and call hours.7 Interestingly, (instrumented) altruism ap-
pears to be positively associated with training hours but not with call hours
while reputation is positively associated with call hours but not with training.
Responding to calls (in uniform on a large red truck with blaring sirens) is
presumably far more visible than training (which usually takes place inside the
station or in the station parking lots). The results suggest that altruism plays
a larger role in the less-visible venue while reputation plays a larger role in the
more-visible one. However, overall our models had little explanatory power and
7These models are of volunteer hours supplied conditional on selecting into volunteering.
famff and invited were considered as possible instruments for a Heckman two-stage estimator
of hours supplied. Results of the two-stage estimations are similar to those presented here.
However, given the strong role that our instrument candidates play in call response in later
models, we doubt their validity here.
16most coeﬃcients were insigniﬁcant. This may be the result of errors in self-
reported participation or may reﬂect a lack of variation in hours.8 The results
in Table 3 are for a pared-down model that, like Model 2 in the preceding table,
does not include demographic controls. The trade-oﬀ between altruism and rep-
utation between the more and less-visible activities is present and of a similar
magnitude in all speciﬁcations, but is not always statistically signiﬁcant.
To our knowledge, previous studies of volunteerism all have relied on self-
reported behavior. However, given that these reports may be unreliable, we
turn to a more objective measure based on call records from six ﬁre depart-
ments. We are able to match 120 ﬁreﬁghters from our survey to these call
records. The data form an unbalanced panel in which each observation records
a ﬁreﬁghter and a call.9 Tables 4 and 5 report the results of several speciﬁca-
tions of a random eﬀects call response model. The eﬀect of altruism is quite
small and insigniﬁcant across models and, not surprisingly, tests of instrumental
variable models suggest that we no longer need to instrument for it. We also
choose to use a linear probability model rather than a random eﬀects probit
model both to avoid potential instability in the use of quadrature and to avoid
diﬃculty in interpreting and calculating standard errors for interaction terms
(Ai and Norton, 2003). Fewer than 3 percent of predictions fall outside of the
[0,1] range and standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity induced by
the linear model. Moreover, the marginal eﬀects presented in Tables 4 and 5
are quite robust to model speciﬁcation; we get similar estimates using random
eﬀects probits and instrumented probits as we do with the random eﬀects linear
probability model that we present.
8The 25th and 75th percentiles of usual monthly training hours were 4 and 11 hours. The
25th and 75th percentiles of usual monthly call hours were 8 and 25 hours.
9Stations with more calls are over-represented in this panel. Controls are included for
station-speciﬁc eﬀects as well as for call volume and spacing. A separate balanced sample
was also created by randomly selecting calls for each ﬁreﬁghter so that the number across
ﬁreﬁghters is the same. Results using the balanced sample are not substantially diﬀerent than
those presented here.
17Table 4 presents three models of call response. In Model 1 we control only
for characteristics of the call, call history, and department ﬁxed eﬀects. We
ﬁnd that ﬁreﬁghters are less likely to respond to calls during typical work hours
or in the middle of the night. Call response is decreasing in the number of
calls in the past week, suggesting the presence of call fatigue. And, as any
volunteer ﬁreﬁghter could tell us, turnout is higher for calls for any sort of ﬁre
as opposed to vehicle accidents, alarms, etc. In Model 2 we add measures of
diﬀerent explanations for prosocial behavior and in Model 3 we add demographic
controls as well. Altruism as measured by the dictator game allocation positively
inﬂuences selection into the ﬁre service, but does not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect
on call response conditional on selection. Reputation, however, continues to
be positively correlated with prosocial behavior; ﬁreﬁghters with a vanity plate
are 16 percentage points more likely to respond to a call than those without.
Endogeneity, however, is still a concern; it may be the case that ﬁreﬁghters
who are more involved in their stations are more likely to purchase a vanity
plate that displays their status. Career is also positively associated with call
response. Interestingly, religion, which was positively correlated with selection
into volunteer ﬁreﬁghting, is negatively associated with participation conditional
on selection. Individuals who are identiﬁed as religious are 14.4 percentage
points less likely to respond to a call.
While we are concerned that the direct eﬀect of reputation may be endoge-
nous, this does not preclude exploring how reputation interacts with extrinsic
motivations, a key point of interest in the recent literature and our theoreti-
cal model. There is substantial variation across volunteer ﬁre departments in
Vermont in the presence and level of small stipends paid to ﬁreﬁghters. Many
departments oﬀer no recompense for the ﬁreﬁghters’ time. However, others have
a small pot of money that is divided annually among the ﬁreﬁghters. Others
pay an hourly stipend for time spent on calls. These payments are unlikely
18to exceed the direct costs of participation in volunteer departments. Seventy
percent of departments in our initial survey oﬀer no compensation and, among
those with an hourly wage for calls, the mean is 8.34, far below the mean salaries
of ﬁreﬁghters who are often leaving work to respond to calls. Moreover, training
time is not compensated by any departments and ﬁreﬁghters are responsible for
purchasing the lights and sirens for their personal vehicles, which cost several
hundred dollars.
In Table 5 we introduce both a dummy variable indicating that the de-
partment pays an hourly stipend and a variable measuring the amount of any
stipend. Because the presence and level of stipends are colinear with the six de-
partments represented in the sample, we remove the department indicators and
replace them with a measure of annual call volume, which is likely an important
determinant of call response that was controlled for previously with the station
indicators.
While it is still likely that omitted characteristics of the station and com-
munity are correlated with stipend, we are more interested in the interaction
between payments and reputational concerns as proxied by having a vanity
plate. These interaction terms in Models 5 and 6 are considerably less likely
to be correlated with the error term given that we have controlled for the di-
rect eﬀects of the interacted terms. In the ﬁrst speciﬁcation, we ﬁnd that the
reputational concerns and the presence of a stipend are both positively associ-
ated with turning out to a ﬁre call. Fireﬁghters with a vanity plate are 33.1
percentage points more likely to respond to a call. Fireﬁghters who are paid an
hourly stipend are 3.0 percentage points more likely to respond than ﬁreﬁghters
who are not paid a stipend. But the positive eﬀect of a stipend is canceled for
ﬁreﬁghters who have vanity plates; the eﬀect of a stipend for those with repu-
tational concerns is eﬀectively zero. Looking at the second model, in which the
level rather than presence of a stipend is used, we see essentially the same result.
19For a $1 increase in the level of the stipend, ﬁreﬁghters who do not have vanity
plates are 21.7 percentage points more likely to turn out to a call. However, the
marginal eﬀect of a stipend for ﬁreﬁghters who have vanity plates is not signif-
icantly diﬀerent from zero. The negative coeﬃcients on the interactions terms
indicate that the positive direct eﬀect of small extrinsic incentives is crowded
out by reputational concerns for some ﬁreﬁghters, as predicted by the model.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced unique data on volunteer ﬁreﬁghters and non-volunteer com-
munity members that combine survey measures of demographic and behavioral
attributes with a measure of altruism generated by the dictator game. The data
also include an objective measure of volunteer labor supply for the ﬁreﬁghters
via departmental call records. Using these data, we are able to test the predic-
tions of a model in which prosocial behavior is determined by a combination of
altruism, reputational concerns, and extrinsic motivations.
We ﬁnd that altruism as measured by the dictator game plays a key role
in the real-life decision to volunteer, and that it also is positively correlated
with ﬁreﬁghter training hours. However, altruism does not appear to inﬂuence
a ﬁreﬁghter’s decision to respond to a call, suggesting that altruism is not an
important motivator in the level of provision of the more visible of the two
ﬁreﬁghting activities. Reputational concerns as proxied by having a vanity
license plate, on the other hand, are positively associated both with the decision
to volunteer and with call responses. We also ﬁnd that social and career concerns
positively inﬂuence volunteerism, while religion has a positive impact on the
decision to volunteer, but is negatively associated with call response conditional
on having volunteered.
Recent research has focused on the potential impacts of oﬀering extrinsic
20incentives for prosocial behavior. We are able to oﬀer empirical evidence on
this by taking advantage of variation in the presence and level of small stipends
paid to volunteer ﬁreﬁghters in Vermont. We ﬁnd that oﬀering such extrinsic
incentives to volunteers has the direct eﬀect of increasing call response. However,
this eﬀect is negated for volunteers with reputational concerns; oﬀering extrinsic
incentives to this group has zero net eﬀect on their volunteer labor supply.
This result suggests that policy makers and volunteer organizations wishing
to inﬂuence prosocial behaviors should account for the complex interplay of
extrinsic incentives and reputation. Volunteers may value monetary rewards,
but such rewards can also have the indirect and presumably unanticipated eﬀect
of discouraging prosocial behavior among those who care about being perceived
as altruistic.
21A Appendix:
Protocols for the behavioral variables
Altruism as measured by Dictator Game
Splitting $100
We begin the survey with a three-part decision-making task that involves real
money. In this task you will allocate $100 between yourself and a charity of
your choice. You will simply decide how much of the $100 you want us to send
directly to you and how much you want us to send to the charity. The funds for
this part of the survey have been provided by the National Science Foundation.
We expect that 500 people will respond to this survey. When we have collected
500 responses we will randomly pick 50 people and implement their decisions.
This means that you have a 1 in 10 chance of having your choice implemented.
In other words, for 1 in 10 people we will send you and/or the charity that you
select actual money. Therefore, you should consider your choices carefully.
The ﬁrst thing that you will do is choose a charity. Then you will choose how
to allocate $100 between yourself and the charity that you picked. If you are one
of the 50 chosen participants, your choice will be implemented and you and/or
your charity of choice will receive the amounts of money that you have selected.
Part A:
Please choose the charity that you want to receive your donation.Pick one of the
following charities or write in a charity at the bottom:
o American Red Cross
o United Way
o Vermont Public Radio
o Amnesty International
22o American Cancer Society
o Doctors without Borders
o United Service Organizations (USO)
o UNICEF
o Vermont Land Trust
o Humane Society of the United States
o Habitat for Humanity
o The Nature Conservancy
o American Diabetes Association
o Other:
Part B:
Choose the amount of money that you want us to allocate to the charity of your
choice. The remaining money will be sent in the form of an anonymous VISA
gift card directly to you.
Allocate of the $100 to my charity of choice and send the rest to me.
Career Questions
For each of the following statements, please indicate how strongly you agree
using the scale provided below.
1:Strongly Disagree 2:Diagree 3:Neither 4:Agree 5:Strongly Agree
In general, it looks good to have volunteering on your resume.
Volunteering can help me to develop skills that will beneﬁt me in my chosen
profession.
Volunteering can help me make contacts that are important to me professionally.
23Extroversion Questions
On the following pages there are phrases describing people’s behaviors. Please
use the rating scale below to indicate how accurately each statement describes
you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the
future.
1:Very Inaccurate 2:Inaccurate 3:Neither 4:Accurate 5:Very Accu-
rate
Feel Comfortable around people.
Make friends easily.
Am skilled in handling social situations.
Don’t like to draw attention to myself.
Talk to a lot of diﬀerent people at parties.
Risk Questions
For each of the following statements, please indicate your likelihood of engaging
in each activity or behavior using the scale provided below.
1:Very Unlikely 2:Unlikely 3:Neither 4:Likely 5:Very Likely
Going down a ski run that is beyond your ability or closed.
Going whitewater rafting during rapid water ﬂows in the spring.
Not wearing a seat belt when a passenger in the front seat.
Periodically engaging in a dangerous sport (e.g., mountain climbing or sky div-
ing).
Trying out bungee jumping at least once.
Piloting your own small plane, if you could.
24Religion Questions
Please rate your religious outlook.
o Religious
o Somewhat religious
o Not very religious
o Not religious
o Don’t know






A complete version of the survey booklet is available at both authors’ websites.
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Figure 2: Allocation to charity in dictator game by volunteer status
29Table 1: Variable descriptions and means
volunteer community
variable description ﬁreﬁghters members
Behavioral factors
altruism allocation to charity in dictator game ($0-$100) 77.35 67.92
reputation I(non-standard (“vanity”) license plate) 0.23 0.11
career factor score for 3 questions about volunteering and ca- 0.26 -0.23
reer concerns
friends1 volunteering is a good way to make friends (scale 1-5) 4.60 4.10
friends2 I(friends on ﬁre department prior to joining) 0.75 0.47
extroversion factor score for 5 extroversion questions 0.18 -0.21
risk factor score for 6 risk questions 0.32 -0.14
religious I(attends religious services and/or rates religious out- 0.66 0.52
look as at least somewhat religious)
family ﬀ I(have family member who is a ﬁreﬁghter) 0.59 0.24
invited I(have been invited to join local ﬁre department) 0.67 0.12
Demographics and other factors
residence far I(home is >2 miles from ﬁre station) 0.35 0.40
work far I(work is >2 miles from ﬁre station) 0.51 0.25
age age in years 38.61 47.99
male I(male) 0.93 0.63
student I(student) 0.08 0.04
married I(married) 0.61 0.59
children <=12 I(young children at home) 0.39 0.64
children 13–18 I(older children at home) 0.26 0.53
<hs education I(education < high school degree 0.08 0.05
hs education I(high school degree) 0.35 0.25
> hs education I(education beyond high school) 0.57 0.70
VT native I(born in Vermont) 0.64 0.46
employed I(currently employed) 0.92 0.76
income <15k I(annual household income <15,000) 0.07 0.09
income 15-35k I(annual household income 15-35,000) 0.16 0.20
income 35-50k I(annual household income 35-50,000) 0.17 0.17
income 50-75k I(annual household income 50-75,000) 0.24 0.22
income 75-100k I(annual household income 75-100,000) 0.16 0.16
income >100k I(annual household income >100,000) 0.20 0.16
wage (if employed) hourly wage or, for salaried workers, imputed wage 17.42 22.92
donation amount of household’s charitable donations in past cal- 469.18 799.39
endar year
Fireﬁghter-speciﬁc variables
presence of stipend I(ﬁre department pays hourly stipend for calls) 0.67 .
amount of stipend amount of hourly stipend or, for departments that oﬀer 5.34
lump sum incentives, imputed hourly stipend
call hours Usual monthly training hours 10.28
training hours Usual monthly call hours 18.94
n 217 189













































Instrumental variables estimation of selection into volunteer ﬁreﬁghting. Instruments for altruism are
mother allocation and random participant allocation. Demographic controls include age, gender, student
status, marital status, children under age 12, children aged 12–18, education level, employment status,
income, wage, Vermont native, annual charitable donations, and distance from residence and place of work
to ﬁre station. *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01.





























































Instrumental variables estimation of selection into volunteer ﬁreﬁghting. In-
struments for altruism are mother allocation and random participant
allocation. Top 1 percent of hours are dropped from analysis as large out-
liers. *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01.
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Random eﬀects linear probability model of call response. Standard errors are robust. Demographic controls
include age, gender, student status, marital status, children under age 12, children aged 12–18, education
level, employment status, income, wage, Vermont native, annual charitable donations, and distance from
residence and place of work to ﬁre station. *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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Random eﬀects linear probability model of call response. Standard errors are robust.
Demographic controls include age, gender, student status, marital status, children under
age 12, children aged 12–18, education level, employment status, income, wage, Vermont
native, annual charitable donations, and distance from residence and place of work to
ﬁre station. *p<0.10 **p<0.05 ***p<0.01
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